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The Death of Reliance 
Randy E. Barnett 
The Rise and Fall of Reliance 
In his classic 1941 article, "Consideration and Form," Lon L. Fuller offered 
the following definition of what he called "private autonomy," which, along 
with the principles of reliance and unjust enrichment, constituted the sub-
stantive basis of contractual enforcement. "Among the basic conceptions of 
contract law," Fuller wrote, 
the most pervasive and indispensable is the principle of private autonorp.y. 
This principle simply means that the law views private individuals as possessing 
a power to effect, within certain limits, changes in their legal relations. The 
man who conveys property to another is exercising this power; so is the man 
who enters a contract. When a court enforces a promise it is merely arming 
with a legal sanction a rule or lex previously established by the party himself. 
This power of the individual to effect changes in his legal relations with 
others is comparable to the power of a legislature. It is, in fact, only a kind of 
political prejudice which causes us to use the word "law" in one case and not 
in the other, a prejudice which did not deter the Romans from applying the 
word lex to the norms established by private agreement. 1 
In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s this view of contracts went into a steep decline. 
By the time I took Contracts in the mid-1970s, it was an article offaith that 
contract was not properly conceived as a means by which persons could, by 
their own choice, make law for themselves to govern their relations. Instead, 
contract was thought best conceived as the rectification of injuries persons 
may have caused by their verbal conduct in much the same way that persons 
have a duty to rectify the injuries caused by their physical acts. With contracts, 
these injuries consisted of detrimental reliance on the words of another. So 
conceived, both contract and tort duties are imposed by law, and do not arise 
from the parties' consent. Thus contract law is conceptually indistinguishable 
from tort law. 
The doctrinal implicati!)ns of this reliance-based conception of contract 
were twofold. First, since duties were imposed by law rather than being the 
product of the parties' consent, we need not concern ourselves with many of 
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the niceties of finding mutual assent in the formation stage. Second, if 
reliance was the basis of contract, then the normal expectation measure of 
recovery was also suspect-justified, if at all, as an indirect way to protect what 
Fuller and Perdue labeled the "reliance interest."2 Indeed, it says much about 
the conventional wisdom during the 1960s and 1970s that Fuller and Perdue's 
justly esteemed 1936 article, "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages," 
received far greater attention than Fuller's later "Consideration and Form."3 
This thesis that contract primarily concerns rectifying detrimental reliance 
was bolstered by two claims contained in Grant Gilmore's classic 1974 mono-
graph, The Death of Contract.4 The first was historical: contract law had been 
artificially separated from tort law in the nineteenth century through the 
creative efforts of Christopher Columbus Langdell and Oliver Wendell Holmes. 
Speaking descriptively, we might say that what is happening is that "contract" 
is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of "tort." Until the general theory of 
contract was hurriedly run up late in the nineteenth century, tort had always 
been our residual category of civil liability. As the contract rules dissolve, it is 
becoming so again.5 
In a footnote to this passage Gilmore observes: 
It is an historical truism that assumpsit, from which our theories of contract 
eventually emerged, was itself a split-off from the tort action of trespass on the 
case. Until the late nineteenth century the dividing line between "contract" 
and "tort" had never been sharply drawn .... No doubt the obscure realization 
that contract (or assumpsit) had its origins in tort accounted, at least in part, 
for the failure to make a clear distinction between contract and tort until the 
nineteenth century theorists insisted on drawing the line.6 
Gilmore's second claim was doctrinal: incorporating the reliance-centered 
section 90 introduced a contradiction into the Restatement of Contracts. This 
contradiction would ultimately be resolved as reliance-based obligation im-
posed by law overwhelmed any distinct concept of contract as consent-based 
obligations originating with the parties. Once again, Gilmore made this point 
most colorfully: 
We have become accustomed to the idea, without in the least understanding 
it, that the universe includes both matter and anti-matter. Perhaps what we 
have here is Restatement and anti-Restatement or Contract and anti-Contract. 
We can be sure that Holmes, who relished a good paradox, would have 
laughed aloud at th~ sequence of § 75 [expressing the bargain theory of 
2. See Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 
Yale LJ. 52 (1936). 
3. A Westlaw search of articles in the journals and Law Reviews database that I conducted on 
November 12, 1996 (unfortunately limited to articles dating from 1981) reveals that "The 
Reliance Interest" is cited in nearly twice as many articles (223) as "Consideration and Form" 
(120). My search strings were (Fuller /s "Consideration and Form") and (Fuller /s Perdue). 
4. Columbus, Ohio, 1974. 
5. ld. at87. 
6. /d. at 140 n.228. 
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consideration] and § 90. The one thing that is clear is that these two 
contradictory propositions cannot live comfortably together: in the end one 
must swallow the other up.7 
Gilmore's view that contract and tort were artificially separated and that 
contract would ultimately collapse into a reliance-based tort reflected the 
views of many enlightened contracts scholars of his day. All the professors who 
taught today's law professors Contracts, as well as the author of whatever 
casebook was used, accepted the view that promissory estoppel was a reliance-
based doctrine that should either supplement-the view of the Restatement 
(Second)-or supplant-the view of many contracts scholars-the bargain 
theory of consideration. What today's law students may know-and law profes-
sors who teach in fields other than contracts should too-:-is that this received 
wisdom has been called into question in the 1980s and 1990s and is in decline. 
Gilmore's historical argument that contract was a nineteenth-century off-
shoot of tort, though widely accepted, was always a curious half-truth. True, 
"[u]ntil the late nineteenth century the dividing line between 'contract' and 
'tort' had never been sharply drawn,"8 as Gilmore said, but that was because 
until the mid-nineteenth century causes of action were determined by forms 
of action, not concepts such as contract or tort. As G. Edward White noted in 
his 1977 article, "The Intellectual Origins of Torts in America": 
The emergence ofTorts as an independent branch oflaw came strikingly late 
in American legal history. Although Blackstone and his contemporaries, in 
their 18th-century efforts to classify law, identified a residual category of 
noncriminal wrongs not arising out of contract, Torts was not considered a 
discrete branch oflaw until the late 19th century. The first American treatise 
on Torts appeared in 1859; Torts was first taught as a separate law school 
subject in 1870; the first Torts casebook was published in 1874.9 
Indeed, virtually all the concepts, categories, and distinctions we now use to 
understand causes of action were "invented" or developed in the nineteenth 
century to serve as a substitute for the forms of action which had defined 
causes of action for centuries. Thus it is as anachronistic to refer to assumpsit 
as a "tort" action as it is to refer to debt, detinue, or covenant as "contract" 
actions. All may be so categorized only by applying concepts developed in the 
late nineteenth century. Contract law no more grew out of torts than did tort 
law grow out of contracts.10 
7. Jd. at61. 
8. Jd. at 140 n.228. 
9. 86Yale LJ. 671, 671 (1977). White attributes this development to increased conceptualization 
among American intellectuals, the collapse of the writ pleading system, and the industrial 
trend in torts cases from disputes between persons in closely defined relationships to disputes 
between strangers. !d. at 672. 
10. It is true that assumpsit was originally a writ that corresponds to what we would today think of 
as a tort. But by the early seventeenth century it had been deliberately changed to enable the 
more ready enforcement of informal contractual agreements. This change necessitated the 
invention later in the seventeenth century of the doctrine of consideration and the passage 
of the Statute of Frauds. All this occurred long before the abolition of the writ system and the 
births of Holmes and Langdell. 
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The contention by Gilmore and others that a solely reliance-based, tort-like 
conception of contract would eventually completely supplant a consent-based 
conception should always have been more suspect than it was. After all, as 
early as 1933 Morris R Cohen observed: "Contractual obligation is not coex-
tensive with injurious reliance because (1)_ there are instances of both injury 
and reliance for which there is no contractual obligation, and (2) there are 
cases of such obligation where there is no reliance or injury." Tellingly he 
noted: "Clearly, not all cases of injury resulting from reliance on the word or 
act of another are actionable, and the theory before us offers no clue as to 
what distinguishes those which are." 11 
Somewhat amazingly, given the widespread sympathy for a reliance-based 
conception of contract, from the 1930s to the 1970s no contracts scholar ever 
published a comprehensive explication of a reliance theory of contract of the 
kind that Charles Fried had attempted-unsuccessfully in my view12-for the 
"will theory" in his 1981 book, Contract as Promise.13 I would speculate that 
many such efforts were begun, but all were quietly abandoned because there 
was simply no way to accomplish such a project. 
By the 1980s, it had begun to be realized that the much-ballyhooed reliance 
revolution in contract law was not to be. In "Developments in Contract Law 
During the 1980's: The Top Ten," E. Allan Farnsworth observed: "The expan-
sion of the role of reliance .. -. did not continue in the 1980s. Indeed, ... the 
trend appears to be in the other direction."14 As he elaborated: 
The 1980s ... did not witness the death of contract. Academic attempts to 
merge contracts into torts in courses called "contorts" failed to flourish and it 
may be argued that contracts, through liberal application of third party 
beneficiary doctrine, invaded the domain of tort during the 1980s .... 
Indeed, as early as the 1981 Association of American Law Schools conference, 
Justice [Abrahamson] of the Wisconsin Supreme Court reported that contracts 
was "viable as a litigation category" and that Gilmore's report of the death of 
contract was highly exaggerated. At the same conference, Gilmore himself 
attempted to provide "an explanation of why this field oflaw, which somebody 
or other said was dead; some time ago, is not only alive and well but bursting 
at the seams."15 
The 1980s also witnessed a scholarly reexamination of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel by an ideologically diverse group of contract scholars to 
see if it could be integrated into a comprehensive theory of contract, rather 
than used as a fulcrum, to move contracts into torts. These scholars include 
Mary Becker, Daniel Farber, Juliet Kostritsky, John Matheson, Steve Thel, 
Edward Yorio, and me-all but one of whom were students when Grant 
11. The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553,579 (1933). 
12. See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1022 
(1992). 
13. Cambridge, Mass., 1981. 
14. 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 203, 219-20 (1990). 
15. Icl. at 221-22 (citing Charles D. Kelso, The 1981 Conference on Teaching Contracts: A 
Summary and Appraisal, 32J. Legal Educ. 616, 616, 640 (1982) ). 
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Gilmore published The Death of Contract in 1974.16 Each reached remarkably 
similar results after surveying massive numbers of promissory estoppel cases. 
In the balance of these comments, I will describe the findings of these 
scholars-findings which have formed the basis of a new consensus that the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel is not primarily about compensating detri-
mental reliance. 
The New Consensus 
To appreciate the nature of the new consensus, it is necessary to clarify an 
important ambiguity in the reliance conception of contract. There are two 
ways that reliance may figure in contract. The first is the tort-like conception 
of contract in which the inducement of detrimental reliance may be held to justify 
a remedy to compensate for the detriment incurred, in the same way that the 
infliction of physical harm justifies a remedy in tort. The second is that 
contracts are viewed as protecting one party's right to rely on the commitment 
of another. Although prior scholarship sometimes blurred these two concep-
tions, the difference between them is crucial. According to the first, it is the 
existence of detrimental reliance or irYury that justifies the enforcement of a 
contractual obligation. According to the second, it is the existence of a 
contractual obligation that justifies reliance:- Thus according to the first we 
enforce contracts because reliance on the promises of another has occurred 
while, according to the second, one reason we enforce contracts is to enable 
p~rties to rely in confidence on each other's promises. 
While the second of these two conceptions views the protection of reliance 
as one end or purpose of contract law, reliance is protected only when there is 
a contract, so the existence of detrimental reliance alone does not tell you 
when reliance will be protected. What must be shown is that an enforceable 
commitment had been made. Traditionally, to be enforceable a commitment 
must have ·been bargained for. The new consensus on promissory estoppel 
views the doctrine as expanding enforcement beyond the requirement of a 
bargain by identifying an additional factor or factors which justify enforce-
ment. When (and only when) such factors exist, reliance will be protected. 
The first, and to my mind still the best, article to reach this conclusion was 
Daniel A. Farber and John H. Matheson's "Beyond Promissory Estoppel: 
Contract Law and the 'Invisible Handshake"' (1985). They introduced their 
thesis as follows: 
As every law student knows, promissory estoppel is based on detrimental 
reliance. Law students share this idea with the American Law Institute and 
with treatise writers. Indeed, promissory estoppel is one of the few points of 
agreement between the critical legal scholars on the left and the law and 
economics writers on the right. Both agree that reliance has been the 
foundation of promissory estoppel, and both accuse the courts ofincoherence 
in applying the doctrine. 
16. The late Edward Yorio graduated from Jaw school in 1971. Daniel Farber graduated in 1975; 
John Matheson and I graduated in 1977; Steve Thel graduated in 1979; Mary Becker and 
Juliet Kostritsky graduated in 1980. Michael Kelly, whose critique of the reliance interest in 
contract damages is discussed below, graduated in 1983. 
The Death of Reliance 
\ 11le have recently surveyed over two hundred promissory estoppel cases 
decided in the last ten years. Our conclusion is that reliance is no longer the 
key to promissory estoppel. Although courts still feel constrained to speak the 
language of reliance, their holdings can best be understood and harmonized 
on other grounds. 
In our view, the expansion of promissory estoppel is not, as some have 
argued, proof that contract is in the process of being swallowed up by tort. 
Rather, promissory estoppel is being transformed into a new theory of distinctly 
contractual obligation.17 
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Farber and Matheson's survey of promissory estoppel cases led them to four 
conclusions about how the doctrine was used. First: "Despite its tentative 
origins and its initial restriction to donative promises, promissory estoppel is 
regularly applied to the gamut of commercial contexts." 18 Second, "promis-
sory estoppel is no longer merely a fallback theory of recovery. Rather, courts 
are now comfortable enough with the doctrine to use it as a primary basis of 
enforcement."19 Third, "reliance plays little role in the determination of 
remedies .... [R] ecent cases are heavily weighted towards the award of full 
expectation damages. The amount of awards for lost profits may be substan-
tial. Courts are also willing to grant equitable remedies, such as specific 
performance or injunctive relief, in cases decided on a promissory estoppel 
theory."2° Finally, and perhaps most important for present purposes, they 
found a "diminished role of reliance in determining liability. The essential 
requirement for liability on a promissory estoppel theory has tradition-
ally been some specific action in justifiable reliance on the promise. This 
requirement of an identifiable detriment no longer defines the boundary 
of enforceability."21 
What then did Farber and Matheson contend explains enforcement in the 
promissory estoppel cases they studied? While their complete account was 
complex, they found that 
[p]romise-making is the linchpin ofliability under both traditional contract 
doctrine and promissory estoppel. The requirement of a promise makes 
liability turn on the voluntary assumption of duty, and thus underlies the 
function of contract law as a promoter of voluntary agreements. But courts 
have long had trouble distinguishing binding commitments from other 
communications such as opiHions, predictions, or negotiations.22 
In promissory estoppel cases, two factors appear to coalesce to enable the 
courts to find that a binding promise has been made: 
17. 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 903,903-05 (1985) (footnotes omitted). 
18. /d. at 907 (footnotes omitted). 
19. Id. at 908. 
20. /d. at 909-10 (footnotes omitted). 
21. /d. at 910 (footnote omitted). 
22. /d. at 914-15. 
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First, ... the promisor's primary motive for making the promise is typically to 
obtain an economic benefit. Second, the enforced promises generally occur 
in the context of a relationship that is or is expected to be ongoing rather 
than in the context of a discrete transaction. These relationships are 
characterized by a need for a high level of mutual confidence and trust.23 
They proposed a new revised rule of promissory obligation that "commit-
ments made in furtherance of economic activity should be enforced." In their 
view, such a rule would acknowledge 
the fundamental fact that commitments are often made to promote economic 
activity and obtain economic benefits without any specific bargained-for 
exchange. Promisors expect various benefits to flow from their promise-
making. A rule that gives force to this expectation simply reinforces the 
traditional free-will basis of promissory liability, albeit in an expanded context 
of relational and institutional interdependence.24 
In 1987 Mary E. Becker and I published an article that reached very similar 
conclusions. For us, one of the problems with the reliance theory of promis-
sory estoppel was, to borrow a phrase from Brian Simpson, its "doctrinal 
monism. "25 That is, it sought a single explanation for a category of cases whose 
only common characteristic was the absence of a bargain. Instead, we argued 
that "promissory estoppel serves two of the functions served by traditional 
contract and tort remedies available to parties in consensual relationships: the 
enforcement of some promises intended as legally binding and the imposition 
ofliability to compensate for harm caused by some misrepresentations."26 
Like Farber and Matheson, we argued that promissory estoppel was used to 
enforce serious promises when the formality of a bargain was lacking, though 
we defined "serious" as manifesting an intention to be legally bound and 
identified a variety of circumstances that evidence this intent even in the 
absence of a bargained-for exchange.27 In addition, we argued that a few 
23. !d. at 925. 
24. !d. at 929. In the appendix to this article I offer a doctrinal alternative to the current 
Restatement scheme that takes their proposal as its ~tarting point. 
25. A. W. B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of 
Assumpsit 325 (Oxford, England, 1975) ("[T]here has always in the common law been a 
tendency towards a sort of doctrinal monism-there must be one test for the formation of 
contract (offer and acceptance), one principle governing possession, one test for the action-
ability of promises."). 
26. Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 
Hofstra L. Rev. 443, 445-46 (1987). Although it was published after Farber and Matheson's 
article, Mary and I first drafted our thesis in the summer of 1983. 
27. We distinguished between promises made in donative settings and those made in commer-
cial settings, and we discussed factors in each which lead a reasonable promisee to conclude 
that the promisor has manifested an intention to be legally bound. In the donative setting we 
discussed formal promises to charities and reliance that had been either invited or observed 
by promisor. In the commercial setting, we discussed implicitly bargained-for reliance, firm 
offers, contract modifications, assurances likely to be regarded as part of overall transaction, 
and promises of pensions at or near retirement. We also discussed when promissory estoppel 
is used to avoid the formal requirements of the Statute of Frauds, the parol evidence rule, 
and the doctrines of indefinite or illusory promises. 
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promissory estoppel cases-including the famous .cases of Goodman v. Dicker8 
and Hoffman v. Red Owl StoreS-9-are not best explained as the contractual 
enforcement of a voluntary assumption of obligation. Rather they are tort 
based, either because there was a negligent factual misrepresentation (e.g., 
Goodman) or because the promisor negligently misrepresented the reliability 
of the promise (e.g., Red Owl). Traditionally, tort liability for promissory 
misrepresentation is normally limited to promises that are "lie [s] when made."30 
We proposed expanding misrepresentation doctrine to include negligent 
promissory representation to mirror the expansion of f<ictual misrepresenta-
tion that now includes negligent representations as well as lies when made. 
In 1991 our findings and those of Farber and Matheson were confirmed 
once again by Edward Yorio and Steve Thel in "The Promissory Basis of 
Section 90." After surveying yet another set of cases, they concluded that 
courts may enforce a promise under Section 90 in the absence of reliance or 
detriment. Conversely, courts may not enforce a promise under the section 
despite detrimental reliance by the promisee. Both results are inconsistent 
with a reliance-based theory .... [T]he critical question for courts under 
Section 90 is which promises to enforce, not what remedy to award or how to 
protect reliance. A promise will be fully enforced under the section if the 
promise is proven convincingly and is likely to have been serious and well 
considered when it was made.31 
Perhaps the most important confirmation of this new consensus on promis-
sory estoppel was provided by Jay M. Feinman, the foremost critical legal 
studies contract scholar. Feinman had broken into the contract law scene in 
1984, the year before Farber and Matheson's article appeared, with "Promis-
sory Estoppel and the Judicial Method," the last major article to trumpet the 
significance of promissory estoppel as a reliance-based contradiction which 
undermined the coherence of contract. There he stated: "The scope of 
promissory estoppel doctrine is determined not only by the application of the 
reliance principle, but also by the resolution of conflicts between that prin-
ciple and other principles of contract law."32 
In 1992, however, Feinman published "The Last Promissory Estoppel Ar-
ticle," in which he discusses each of the studies I have summarized here. In a 
striking confession and avoidance, he now contends that "promissory estoppel 
is no longer an appropriate doctrine, given recent developments in the wider 
scheme of contract law and theory, and thus it is time to move on. Indeed, we 
ought to abandon not only promissory estoppel but also the framework of 
28. 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948). 
29. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). 
30. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 26, at 486. 
31. 101 Yale LJ. 111, 113 (1991). Though their article did confirm earlier work, Yorio and The! 
can, perhaps, be faulted for not offering a theory as to what constitutes a "serious" promise, 
something both Farber/Matheson and Becker/Barnett attempted to do. 
32. 97 Harv. L. Rev. 678, 695 (1984). 
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contract thinking that has given it vitality."33 That he would replace the 
traditional framework with what he calls a more "relational approach"34 is less 
important for present purposes than the fact that he fails to challenge the 
accuracy of the scholarship which contends that reliance is dead as a theory of 
promissory estoppel.35 
There is one respect in which the reliance principle remains alive in 
contract law scholarship. The extent of detrimental reliance is still viewed as 
an appropriate fallback measure of contract damages when, for some reason, 
the expectation interest cannot be calculated-for example, when lost profits 
are too uncertain. Yet even this use of reliance has been called into question in 
an article by Michael B. Kelly. In "The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages," Kelly argues that although courts appear to be using the reliance 
interest when expectation damages are uncertain, either they are not doing so 
or they are awarding the wrong measure of damages.36 What courts do, or 
should do, in such circumstances is to award the expectation interest on the 
assumption of zero profits unless the victim of the breach proves the existence 
oflost profits or the party in breach proves that the contract was a losing one. 
Kelly writes: 
The goals of the reliance interest may be better served if we banish the 
language of reliance from discussions of contract damages. With very few 
(and fairly minor) exceptions, the expectation interest meets the normative 
goals set by the reliance interest-at least in those cases where courts have 
33. 61 Fordham L. Rev. 303, 304 (1992). In addition to the studies I have summarized here, 
Feinman discusses another article advocating an assent-based conception of promissory 
estoppel doctrine: Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging 
Under the Guise of Promissory Estoppel, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 895 (1987). Feinman, sufJTa, at 
310-11. 
34. I propose that contract law should take one step beyond Farber and Matheson 
and embrace a truly relational analysis. This relational approach would 
constitute revolutionary science, rather than a further attempt to refine the 
normal science of neoclassical law. As particularly relevant ty promissory 
estoppel, this move would replace the neoclassical elements of a focus on 
promise and a baseline oflimited liability with the ideas that relationships are 
both different from, and more common than, discrete transactions. 
Furthermore, relationships necessarily involve obligations; the only questions 
are what kinds of obligations different relationships involve and which of 
those obligations should be translated into legal obligations. 
Feinman, supra note 33, at311. 
35. True, Feinman can rightly claim to have always advocated transcending the consideration/ 
promissory estoppel dichotomy. But the justification for this transformation used to be the 
tension or contradiction between the bargain theory of consideration and the reliance-based 
doctrine of promissory estoppeL Now that contracts scholars have eroded the traditional 
dichotomy by dispelling the notion that promissory estoppel is reliance based, Feinman's 
justification for transcending the doctrine is that it is insufficiently "relationaL" But there is 
more than one view of what a relational approach entails. See Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting 
Visions: A Critique oflan Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1175 ( 1992) 
(distinguishing liberal from communitarian relational theories and criticizing the latter). 
36. 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1755. Kelly disapproves of the court's unwillingness in Chicago Coliseum 
Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932), to award damages for expenses incurred before 
the contract was executed because, in the view of the court, there could have been no 
reliance on a promise that had yet to be made. He approves of the outcome of Anglia 
Television Ltd. v. Reed, [1972] 1 Q,B. 60 (C.A. 1971), in which the court awarded damages 
for precontractual expenses. According to Kelly the outcome of one of these cases must be 
wrong. 
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shown any inclination to base recoveries on reliance at all. We need only fix 
recoveries at the level of zero profit unless one party can prove that 
performance would have produced profits or losses. This presumption of 
zero profit captures the essence of existing contract law. In addition, the 
presumption can clarity and add consistency to the judicial treatment of 
precontract expenses and unallocated overhead.:" 
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In this way, victims of breach would be able to recover even those expenses 
which they incurred before entering into the contract absent proof that they 
would have lost money on the transaction.38 
Beyond the Second Restatement: A Reform Proposal 
Notwithstanding the scholarly consensus about what the courts are really 
doing and what they ought to do, I am not hopeful that courts will soon move 
beyond the traditional bargain theory/promissory estoppel dichotomy.39 The 
reason for this is the effect of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Courts 
are increasingly treating the Restatement as a statute. Judges typically look to 
the Restatement, rather than to even very practical and accessible legal schol-
arship, to ascertain the prevailing contract doctrine. They are unwilling to 
move beyond the safe-haven framework it provides. Thus, though the Restate-
ment undoubtedly hastened the improvement of contract doctrine in some 
areas, it has also served to stultify further improvement. 
For this reason, what students may know and law professors probably 
should know about the death of reliance is probably unknown to judges. 
Judges may do in practice what these scholars describe them as doing, but they 
are not aware of it. Perhaps this should cause us to stop and reflect on the 
merits of the Restatement movement as a means of supplanting a true com-
mon law process of legal development. At a minimum, it might cause us to 
advocate, as Thomas Jefferson did with respect to the Constitution, a revolu-
tion every generation or so. Perhaps it is time to revise the Restatement of 
Contracts to reflect the new consensus. 
To that end Farber and Matheson proposed in their article the following 
replacement for the current doctrinal scheme: "A promise is enforceable 
when made in furtherance of an economic activity."40 To this I have added 
three more sections.41 In contrast to the "death of contract" approach of Grant 
37. Kelly, supra note 36, at 1845-46. 
38. Kelly concludes that 
[a] unified measure of damages focusing on the expectation interest with a 
presumption of zero profit offers some advantages over a remedial structure 
involving alternative remedies. The unified structure maintains a single, 
familiar approach. It avoids issues of election of remedies. It avoids confusion 
regarding overlapping remedies. It minimizes concern for strategic choices 
among remedial alternatives. And it helps judges focus on a single objective. 
!d. at 1838. 
39. That is why this article is entitled "The Death of Reliance" and not "The Death of Promissory 
Estoppel." 
40. Farber & Matheson, supra note 17, at 930. 
41. See Randy E. Barnett, Contracts: Cases and Doctrine 904-15 (Boston, 1995). 
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Gilmore, my proposed sections, which appear as an appendix to this article, 
preserve the traditional distinction between contract and tort as well as be-
tween contract and restitution. They distinguish between commercial and 
noncommercial promises. Commercial promises are presumptively enforce-
able unless the parties, by using formalities, indicate their intention not to be 
legally bound. In contrast, noncommercial promises are presumed to be 
unenforceable unless the parties formally manifest their intention to be 
legally bound. Another section identifies when the existence of detrimental 
reliance can manifest to a promisee the promisor's intention to be legally 
bound. 
My proposed doctrinal scheme attempts to facilitate both aspects of free-
dom of contract-freedom. to contract and freedom from contract42-by set-
ting the background presumption in a manner that reflects the tacit under-
standing of most persons.43 With commercial promises, freedom to contract is 
facilitated by presuming such contracts to be enforceable, while enforcing the 
parties' expression of their intention not to be legally bound respects their 
freedom from contract. With noncommercial promises, the parties' freedom 
from contract is facilitated by presuming such contracts to be unenforceable, 
and enforcing the parties' expression of their intention to be legally bound 
respects their freedom to contract. The differential treatment of promises 
made in these two distinct contexts reflects the comparative likelihood that 
parties in each context intend to be legally bound by their promises. 
While this doctrinal scheme is far from simple (and I welcome suggestions 
for its improvement), perhaps the primary source of the weakness of section 
90 as a rule of law was the idea (espoused by Gilmore and many others) that 
the cases embraced by the doctrine of promissory estoppel could be explained 
simply by the concept of detrimental reliance. Ironically, this sentiment is 
remarkably similar to the common law's monistic preference for a single 
criterion of enforceability. Perhaps in this instance-to paraphrase Gilmore-
multiplication is preferable to division. 44 
42. See Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2J.L. & Com.l93, 194 (1982) ([T]hc law 
of contracts ... constantly reflects the tension between 'freedom to' and 'freedom from.'"); 
see also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 
Va. L. Rev. 821, 869-73 (1992) (explaining and justifying this distinction while attempting to 
reconcile the tension). 
43. For an argument that this is how the default rules of contract law ought to be determined, sec 
Barnett, supra note 42, at 874-94. 
44. See Gilmore, supra note 4, at 89 ("[T]he legal mind h~ always preferred multiplication to 
division."). 
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Appendix 
Restatement (Third) of Contracts 
§ 71A. Enforceability of Commercial Promises1 
A promise is enforceable when made in furtherance 
of an economic activity. 
Comment: 
529 
a. Rationale and relation to other rules. This section deals with what 
has traditionally been called consideration-namely, the legal conclusion 
that a promise is enforceable. Prior rules tested every promise or 
modification to determine whether the promise was conditioned on some 
tangible bargained-for exchange. The present section eliminates the need 
for finding a specific bargained-for. promise or performance for each 
promise or modification. Rather, the key determination is whether the 
promise is designed to induce the creation of or to aid in the continuation 
of economic activity. The rule posits the social and economic utility of 
promises made in furtherance of economic activity. 
The term "economic activity'' includes sales of goods and services, 
leases, loans, insurance and employment arrangements, ind similar 
transactions, whether involving businesses or individuals. The operations 
of organized charities are considered economic activities for purposes of 
this section. The requirement that the promise be "in furtherance" of the 
economic activity carries the implication that the promisor must expect a 
benefit to result from the promise. This expectation of benefit is to be 
demonstrated on the basis ·Of an objective standard, and may often be 
presumed from the circumstances. 
If the requirement of promise in furtherance of economic activity is 
met, there is no additional requirement of (1) a gain, advantage, or 
benefit to the promisor or a loss, disadvantage, reliance, or detriment to 
the promisee; (2) equivalence in the values exchanged; or (3) mutuality of 
obligation. Further, many of the promises denominated under the 
Restatement, Second, of Contracts as without consideration would be 
enforceable under this section if they occur in furtherance of economic 
activity. See, e.g., Restatement, Second, of Contracts § 87 (options 
contracts), § 88 (guarantees), § 89 (modifications), § 90 (promises enforced 
1. This section is taken from Farber & Matheson, supra note 17, at 930-34. They numbered 
their proposal § 71 and entitled it "The Enforceability of Promises." Other changes or 
additions I have made to their original proposal are indicated by brackets. In addition, all 
footnotes from the original have been omitted. I make no claims that Farber or Matheson 
endorses either the additional hypothetical sections that appear here or the linkage of these 
sections to their original proposal. 
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on the basis of reliance). Modern courts have made significant strides 
toward accomplishing the effect of this section by expanding the notion of 
the performance required for creation of a unilateral contract or by 
diluting the concept of reliance in promissory estoppel situations. 
IDustrations: 
1. A and B were employed as truck drivers for C. A and B 
formulated a plan to become independent truck owners but still 
continue driving for C. C gave A and B assurances of long-term 
employment and a sufficient amount of work to enable them to 
make payments on the trucks they purchased. After A and B 
purchased the trucks, C refused to honor its commitment and 
terminated A and B. C's promise is binding and A and B are entitled 
to damages without regard to whether C's promises were ''bargained 
for" or whether A and B provided anything in exchange for C's 
promises. 
2. A, a long-time employee of B, accepts a promotion to a 
salaried position. At the time of promotion, B promised A that A 
would get pension credit for several of his previous years of service 
as an hourly employee not otherwise covered under the pension 
plan. When A retired, B refused to credit A's pension for the earlier 
period. B's promise is binding even though the express terms of the 
pension plan denied A credit for the earlier period, and without 
regard to whether A can show detriment or disadvantage. 
3. A and B are former husband and wife operating under a 
court-ordered dissolution decree and settlement agreement. After A 
is $7800 in arrears on required payments, he and B agree that B will 
accept immediate $1000 partial payment plus A's promissory note 
for $3500 as full satisfaction of the outstanding obligation. 
Subsequently B brings suit for the full delinquent amount and A 
interposes the modified agreement as a defense. Because the promise 
was not made in furtherance of any economic activity, B's promise to 
accept less is not binding under this section. However, the promise 
may be enforceable under other principles of contract law. See, e.g., 
Restatement, Second, of Contracts § 73 (performance oflegal duty), 
§ 7 4 (settlement of claims), § 89 (modification of executory contract) 
[,Restatement, Third, of Contracts § 71B (enforceability of 
noncommercial promises),§ 71C (enforceability of promises by virtue 
of reliance)]. 
4. Corporation A prepared a bid for leasing a computer to 
Corporation B. A was running behind schedule and asked an agent 
of B to pick up the bid at the airport. The agent, after agreeing to 
pick up the bid, declined to do so and the bid arrived too late for 
consideration. Assuming the agent acted within his actual or 
apparent authority, B is bound by the agent's representation. If A 
can show that it would have been awarded the lease, it can recover 
lost profits. 
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[5. A promises not to revoke an offer to sell linoleum to B at a 
particular price for a period of 90 days in a writing reciting a 
purported consideration of$1.00. A's offer is irrevocable whether or 
not B relies upon it.] 
b. Promises, acts and resulting relations. This section requires that a 
promise have been made. A promise is a manifestation of intention to act 
or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee 
in understanding that a commitment has been made. A promise may be 
stated in words, either orally or in writing, or may be inferred wholly or 
partly from conduct. Compare Restatement, Second, of Contracts §§ 
18-19 (manifestation of assent). Both language and conduct are to be 
understood in the light of the circumstances, including course of 
performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade. 
lllustration: 
[6]. A leased property from B under a ten-year agreement, with 
an option for A to renew upon written notice for each of six additional 
five-year periods. During the second extension B died and C became 
trustee ofB's estate. B had twice extended the lease on oral notice. C 
cannot enforce the contract provision requiring written notice if, 
under all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person inNs 
position would believe that B had committed himself to accepting 
oral notice. 
c. Opinions and predictions. A promise must be distinguished from a 
statement of opinion or a mere prediction of future events. Whether 
manifestations rise to the level of a promise depends on various factors, 
including the clarity of the manifestations, the nature of the relationship 
between the parties, and the circumstances surrounding the 
manifestations. [See Restatement, Third, of Contracts § 71D (intention to 
create legal relations).] ... 
d. Agency limitations. Many promises that might otherwise be 
actionable under this section occur in a context where the party making 
the manifestations has neither actual nor apparent authority to bind the 
principal to the manifestations. See Restatement, Second, of Agency §§ 7, 
8. Such lack of authority is particularly likely in large organizations 
where the manifestations are made by non-policymaking employees. The 
more substantial the hierarchical structure, the less likely that such 
manifestations represent authorized commitments. On the other hand, 
where such manifestations come to the attention of the principal and• no 
effort is made to clarify or disavow them, the principal may.be bound by 
the promises on the basis of affirmance or ratification. See Restatement, 
Second, of Agency §§ 82, 83. 
lllustration: 
[7.] A, a retail sales employee for a large department store 
chain, B, was told by her superior, C, that A would not be discharged 
except for just cause. Enforceability of this representation depends 
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upon C's actual or apparent authority to bind B, or, absent such 
authority, upon conduct reflecting B's affirmance or ratification of 
such representations. 
§ 71B. Enforceability of Noncommercial Promises 
(1) A promise not made in furtherance of an 
economic activity is binding if the promise is in 
writing that is signed by the promisor and either 
(a) is under seal, or 
(b) recites a nominal consideration, or 
(c) contains an expression of intention to be 
legally bound, or 
(d) is also signed at the same time by the 
promisee. 
(2) A promise not made in furtherance of an 
economic activity that fails to meet the 
requirements of (1) is not ordinarily binding. 
Comment: 
a. The role of formalities in determining enforceability. As recognized 
in § 71A, in commercial settings there is a presumption that serious 
informal commitments for which parties expect to receive a reciprocal 
benefit are intended to create or alter legal relations. In contrast, in 
noncommercial settings, even informal commitments for which persons 
expect to receive a reciprocal benefit are unlikely to be intended by them 
to be legally binding. 
When such commitments are accompanied by a formality that 
performs both evidentiary and cautionary functions, however, this 
commitment should presumably be legally binding. Consequently, this 
section provides that writings which are either under seal, recite a 
nominal consideration, contain an expression of intention to be legally 
bound, or are contemporaneously signed by both parties may perform a 
channelling function for persons seeking to bind themselves legally. 
Compare Uniform Written Obligations Act § 1. 
Conversely, persons in social relationships need, in the words of Lon 
Fuller, "a field of human intercourse freed from legal restraints," where 
they "may without liability withdraw assurances once given." To protect 
this "domain of free-remaining relations," this section limits enforcement 
to written promises that are made in such a way as to manifest an 
intention to be legally bound. However, in rare situations, noncommercial 
promises that fail to satisfy the formal requirements of this section may 
be enforceable under Restatement, Third, of Contracts § 71C or § 71D. 
lliustrations: 
1. An uncle promises in a signed writing to pay his niece $5,000 
on condition that she quit her job. If the writing is under seal or was 
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signed by the niece at the same time as her uncle, the promise is 
enforceable. 
2. An uncle orally promises to pay his nephew $5,000 on 
condition that the nephew refrain from smoking. Later, in a signed 
letter to the nephew, he acknowledges having made the promise. 
The promise is not enforceable. 
3. A is the parent of B. A promises Bin writing to give her a car 
worth $10,000 "in return for valuable consideration of $1.00." A's 
promise is enforceable. 
4. A and B are living in the same household and are in an 
intimate sexual relationship. A, an executive, orally promises B, a 
musician, to support him for the rest of her life. The promise is 
unenforceable regardless of whether B relies on the promise. 
5. A promises in writing to pay to his daughters an amount 
equal to that which their mother left to him in her will. He also 
states in the writing that he "intends to be legally bound." The 
promise is enfo~ceable. 
6. A promises to donate· $5,000 to B, a religious college, in a 
signed writing that includes the statement that, "I hereby intend to 
be legally bound." A's promise is enforceable regardless of whether 
B relies upon it. 
§ 71 C. Enforceability of Promises by Virtue of Reliance 
(1) Detrimental reliance upon a promise is neither 
essential to the formation of a contract nor sufficient 
to justify enforcement of a promise. 
2) Nonetheless, a promise is enforceable by virtue 
of reliance when 
Comment: 
(a) with the knowledge of the promisor, a 
promisee substantially relies upon it in a 
way that would be unlikely in the absence of 
a manifested intention by the promisor to 
be legally bound, and 
(b) the promisee is aware that the promisor 
has knowledge of the promisee's reliance, 
and 
(c) the promisor remains silent concerning 
the promisee's reliance. 
a. Detrimental reliance. When the circumstances described in §§ 
71A and 71B exist, there frequently will be detrimental reliance on the 
promise in question. Such reliance, however, is unnecessary to support a 
recovery. When these circumstances are absent, whether a promisor 
intends to be legally bound is often ambiguous, in which case the promise 
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would ordinarily be unenforceable, despite the existence of detrimental 
reliance. 
I 
b. When reliance alone justifies enforcement of a promise. This 
section is intended to supplement §§ 71A and 71B by adding to the bases 
of enforceability those circumstances in which the existence of very 
substantial reliance is itself persuasive evidence that a promisor intended 
his promise to be binding. When a promisee makes large expenditures in 
reliance on a promise of a size that would not ordinarily be made in the 
absence of a legally binding commitment by the promisor and the promisee 
knows that the promisor is aware of these expenditures, by failing to 
warn or discourage the promisee from so relying the promisor's silence 
communicates an intention to be legally bound. Compare Restatement, 
Second, of Contracts § 69 (when silence constitutes an acceptance). In 
sum, the existence of these circumstances resolves the ambiguity that 
may have existed at the time the promise was made as to the contractual 
intentions of the promisor and justifies enforcing the promise. 
illustration: 
1. A promises to convey to B, her son, a parcel of land for 
farming. B moves on the land and makes substantial improvements 
to it with the knowledge of A. A remains silent while B improves the 
land. A's promise is enforceable. 
§ 71D. Intention to Create or Alter Legal Relations 
(1) To be legally enforceable as a contract, a promise 
must be made in such a way as to manifest the 
promisor's intention to be legally bound. 
(2) When the conditions of§§ 71A, 71B(l), or 71C(2) 
are satisfied, it is presumed that the parties 
intended that their commitments be legally 
enforced. 
{3) A promisor may rebut the presumption created 
by (2) by showing that a reasonable person would 
not have understood the promisor to have intended 
the promise to be legally binding. 
Comment: 
a. The requirement of intention to be legally bound. Promises are 
enforceable as contracts only if they are made in such a manner as to 
manifest the intention of the promisor to be legally bound. Since intentions 
are necessarily hidden from view, this element of enforceability must be 
established circumstantially by interpreting the normal meaning of a 
person's verbal and nonverbal behavior in a particular context or setting. 
Compare Restatement, Second, of Contracts § 87{a) (option contract 
enforceable when in the form of a signed writing reciting a purported 
consideration); § 88(1)(a) (written guaranty enforceable when signed by 
the promisor and reciting a purported consideration); § 90(2) (enforcing 
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charitable subscriptions and marriage settlements without proof of 
reliance), and Uniform Commercial Code § 2-204 (agreements with open 
terms enforceable "if the parties have intended to make a contract"); § 2-
205 (enforcing "firm offers" without consideration). 
b. Proving the intention to be legally bound. §§ 71A, 71B, and 71C 
describe circumstances from which a manifestation of intention to be 
legally bound can reliably be inferred. Consequently, when these 
circumstances are shown to exist, such an intention will be presumed. 
However, in a particular case, there may be other ways of establishing 
the existence of an intention to be legally bound in which case enforcement 
may be available under this section. 
lllustration: 
1. A is a company that has employed B for 30 years. In 
recognition of past services, A's board of directors passes a formal 
resolution promising to pay B a pension for life and B is informed of 
the resolution. The promise is enforceable whether or not B relies 
upon it. 
c. Manifested intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations. 
As described in § 71A, with promises in commercial settings the 
requirement of a manifested intention to be legally bound is ordinarily 
satisfied by the expectation that the promisor will receive a reciprocal 
benefit from the promisee. As described in § 71B, with promises in 
noncommercial settings, this requirement is ordinarily satisfied by a 
formality that indicates an intention to be legally bound. Neither of these 
indicia of consent to be legally bound is invariably accurate, however, and 
may therefore be rebutted by appropriate evidence to the contrary. 
Compare Restatement, Second, of Contracts § 21. 
illustrations:2 
2. A, a long-term employee with B corporation, sues for 
severance pay after being separated from the company. The basis of 
.A:s claim is a portion of the employee handbook entitled "Separation 
Allowance." The Separation Allowance section states that "[t]he 
inclusion of a schedule of separation allowances in the handbook, 
together with the conditions governing their payment, . . . is not 
intended nor is it to be interpreted to establish a contractual 
relationship with the employee." The last page of the handbook also 
contains an express, conspicuous disclaimer. Absent other 
circumstances indicating that B corporation had an express policy of 
not observing the stated limitations or that a reasonable employee 
would not have seen or understood the disclaimers, A's claim fails. 
3. Physician B performed a vasectomy on his patient, A. A 
month after the operation B examines A and tells A that it was 
impossible for A to father any more children. Within a year A 
2. Illustrations 2 and 3 are based on those provided in id. at 933-34. 
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impregnates his wife. B's statement, in the context of the ordinary 
doctor/patient relationship, should have been seen as a mere 
therapeutic reassurance, not a promise. 
c. Other theories of recovery. The inability to justify enforcement of a 
promise on contractual grounds under this section and §§ 71A, 71B, and 
71C does not preclude recovery on other grounds, such as those provided 
by the law of torts and restitution. For example, enforcement of a promise 
in tort may be justified on grounds of negligent misrepresentation. Or 
enforcement of a promise in restitution may be justified if the making of a 
promise in return for a previously received benefit negates the inference 
that the benefit was intended as a gift. Compare Restatement, Second, of 
Contracts § 86. 
illustrations: 
4. A applies for a franchise to sell a line of electronics from B. 
B's employee knowingly or negligently tells A that the franchise 
application has been approved when in fact it has not. A may 
recover from B for any expenditures incurred in reliance on the 
employee's misrepresentation. 
5. A is employed by B to repair a vacant house. By mistake A 
repairs the house next door, which belongs to C. A subsequent 
promise by C to pay A the value of the repairs is binding.3 
6. A applies to B for a franchise for a grocery store. B's employee 
in good faith assures A that the application will be approved if only 
she supplies $25,000 cash. In reliance on this assurance A then 
makes expenditures in anticipation of receiving the franchise. B's 
employee knows that the decision as to the amount of A's cash 
contribution is made by another employee, that required cash 
contributions may vary, and that the decision as to A's cash 
contribution has yet to be made. Later it is decided that A must 
contribute $50,000. A refuses to supply this much money and her 
application is denied. If A was unaware of the decision-making 
procedure when B's employee gave his assurances, B will be liable to 
reimburse A for her expenditures. 
7. A is severely injured while preventing a large block from 
falling upon B. B's subsequent promise to pay for .A:s medical expenses 
is binding. 
3. This appears as illustration 4 to Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 86. 
